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HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION: TERMINAL
CONTROL AREA BOUNDARY CONFLICTS
By
Captain William P. Monan °
INTRODUCTION
"After our near miss, the Captain asked the controller if he 'had' the
traffic. The reply was 'negative'. The Captain then asked,
'shouldn't he have the traffic on radar?' This reply was, 'no, that
aircraft is above the TCA'."
Terminal control areas (TCAs) are familiar operational concepts to the airmen users,
both pilots and controllers, of the National Airspace System. Invisible, mere lines and
symbols drawn on avigation charts, yet real in dimensions and legally significant, the 23
complex volumes of special use airspace tower from 7000 to 12,500 feet (MSL) above all
major airports in the country. By system plan and design, these airspace control rings
segregate VFR aircraft not under positive ATC control from all controlled traffic (includ-
ing all commercial passenger carrying aircraft) during initial climb segments from, or
instrument approaches into, the busy primary terminals.
Incident reports submitted to the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) indicate
that the TCA enclosures do indeed screen out much VFR traffic from flight through the
terminal areas. However, ASRS reports also offer evidence that, like any other fences,
the invisible TCA barriers tend to divert the stream of VFR traffic into close-to-the-boun-
dary flow patterns. The upper control layers deflect the enroute fly-bys upward, down-
ward, and outward, either pushing them to above-the-ceiling altitudes or fanning them into
wide circular arcs around and below lower TCA rings.
Previously regional director of flight operations for an international airline, Captain
Monan now serves as an aviation safety research consultant to the Battelle Columbus
Division's ASRS Office.
The mid-altitude rings frequently are tailored to peripheral airport locations: the
concentric circles often are modified into complex shapes--diagonally sliced or scalloped
or notched, or at times, even tunneled with intemal passageways--so as to minimize off-
route detouring of VFR aircraft climbing or descending alongside the TCA's vertical
walls. Down low, the bases of the TCA towers deflect light plane, local field operations
outward into areas underneath the marquee-like overhangs of the upper TCA floors.
In popular usage, the shape of the TCA is likened to an upside down wedding cake.
This analogy is by now well rooted; it can be seen in both official and unofficial publica-
tions as well as in training manuals and syllabi. Figure la exemplifies the visual portray-
al almost universally used in such publications. This is the mental image many, if not
most, airmen have of what a TCA looks like. This image distorts the vertical to horizon-
tal spatial aspect ratio of TCAs. Figure lb is more accurate. The hypothetical TCA
dimensioned here has about thirty square miles of horizontal boundary to every one of
vertical boundary. It could be likened to a frisbee or a round serving platter. In any
case, consideration of "the boundary situation" at TCAs has to recognize that most of that
boundary is horizontal.
Hundreds of individual reports to the ASRS, submitted over a seven-year period,
provide, incident by incident, a comprehensive portrayal of the characteristic outside-the-
boundary environment. Above, below, and alongside TCA boundaries a mix of aircraft
types circulates, differing in operational missions, airmen experience, and behavioral traits.
High speed turboprops share this space with helicopters, float planes with TV traffic
aircraft, singles with multi-engines, hurrying corporates and air taxis with slow private
pilot training or pleasure flights or real estate survey rides--none with need either for
communications with, or control from, the ATC facility governing the neighboring TCA.
All air carrier and other IFR traffic transitioning into or from TCA terminal airspace
must pass through this layer of see-and-avoid boundary traffic. A TCA controller's call-
out of traffic--"numerous VFR aircraft in your area"--appeared frequently in airmen's
narrations of their traffic conflicts in TCA perimeter crossings. Perhaps more than any-
thing else, this bit of ATC phraseology serves to epitomize the IFR]VFR traffic mix
problems that exist around TCAs.
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SURFACE
a. A Typical Not-to-Scale Portrayal (From "FAA
Aviation News", November-December, 1987)
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b. True Shape of a Typical TCA as Viewed
from the Side (Modeled on San Francisco)
FIGURE 1. SHAPE OF TCAs AS POPULARLY PORTRAYED VERSUS THE ACTUAL SHAPE
Following are the results of our examination and analysis of the seven-year intake of
TCA boundary conflict reports received at ASRS between May 1976 and August 1983.
All the occurrence reports in the screened study dataset involved conflicts with or among
VFR aircraft located in the vicinity of TCA airspace boundaries, either inside or outside,
and where "proximity to the TCA" was judged by the reporters or by ASRS analysts to
have been a factor in the occurrences. The conflicts studied were those classified in
ASRS terminology as either "near midair collisions" (usually conflicts where the reported
miss distances were less than 500 feet) or "hazardous conflicts" (threat of actual collision
clearly present from context of report but miss distances 500 feet or greater). We
excluded conflicts between two IFR aircraft since the TCA and its boundaries are opera-
tionally invisible to such aircraft and therefore not a factor in conflicts involving them. It
follows from this that all occurrences in the dataset were in nominally acceptable visual
meteorological conditions.
During the analysis, the reports were sorted into those describing conflicts outside
the TCA boundaries versus those where the conflicts were inside and resulted from
unauthorized penetrations. Subsequently, it became apparent that a related and important
concern was the difficulty some airmen had experienced in obtaining access to TCA
airspace, and the consequences thereof.
CONFLICTS IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE TCA BOUNDARIES
"After the near miss, the pilot of the light twin came on the frequen-
cy. He advised that indeed he was at 8500 feet (500 above the TCA
ceiling), he was VFR, he was legal, and he had as much right to that
airspace as anyone else."
A total of 381 traffic conflicts adjacent to TCA boundaries were reported to ASRS
during the seven-year data period. A conflict was considered adjacent to a TCA if it was
within 1000 feet of wall, floor, or ceiling; or if a reporter clearly stated that the presence
of a TCA governed or strongly affected decisions and actions. Figure 2 displays the
distribution of these occurrences by generic location and types of participants. Two-thirds
of the set involved air carriers and these were more or less evenly divided above and
below the TCA. The remaining mix of VFR/VFR and VFR/military conflicts were most-
ly below the TCA floors. Thesebelow-the-floor conflicts tendedto cluster near the walls
of the next lower tings and thus could also be thought of as lying outside the TCA's
lateral boundaries. However, proximity to the floors seemedthe more significant factor in
most of the cases. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the datasetcontained no re-
ports of conflicts locatedoutsidethe top ring of the TCA and within its altitude band.
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Figure 2. LOCATION AND TYPES OF CONFLICTS
IN TCA EXTERNAL BOUNDARY AREAS
The most repetitive and, perhaps, most disturbing element in this 381-report dataset
was that in virtually all instances, everyone was legal. No matter who the participants--
ATC controller, transport flight crew, military, corporate or general aviation pilot--all were
in the tight with respect to the applicable FARs and operational manuals. Recognizing
the no-fault, no-blame circumstances, reporter protests about the conflicts were perforce
limited to "Hey, this is dangerous" types of reactions.
cupy
VFR
The issue of legality frequently surfaced in the report narratives. The right to oc-
boundary airspace seemed a sensitive matter, swiftly and emphatically declared by
airmen, and reluctantly accepted by IFR participants in the conflict occurrences:
"The other aircraft was reported at 9500 feet, above the 7000 foot TCA ceiling,
so that it appeared that everyone was legal."
"On the localizer, we almost collided with a small aircraft--a 50 to 75 foot
miss. He was VFR, operating outside the TCA, so he could go anywhere and
do anything he pleased .... "
"From this incident, I learned that a midair can happen and yet, everyone could
be legal in all respects."
Territorial Attitudes
Legality notwithstanding, many of the objective narrations of near collision occurren-
ces continued into "but..." "nevertheless..." and "however..." subjective statements of
disapproval and censure. Charges of "poor judgement", "lack of good sense", and "he
ought to know better" personal assessments frequently were levied--criticisms that applied
to some airman's intrusion into boundary altitudes or locations normally occupied by other
categories of airspace users. "So, he was legal", summed up one airman, "legal but
almost dead. .... This type of activity should stay away from this area", commented anoth-
er reporter. "I don't believe a non-transponder aircraft belongs anywhere near where we
operate", remarked a third pilot. These and many similar "don't belong here" observations
implied and, at times, boldly staked out, informal but definitive claims of territorial im-
peratives to specific operational sectors in the TCA perimeter layers:
"Over a VOR is not a good place to practice acrobatics!"
"He appeared to be centered directly over the ABC VOR. A perfectly legal
but very unsafe location."
"Practicing chandelles at the edge of the TCA is not a very smart idea."
Air Carder Tcrrit0ry. - User concepts about due ownership of the boundary airspace
conformed with operational practice. Air carrier flight crew reporters often seemed to
regard the levels above TCA ceiling altitudes as "their territory". Their reports reflected
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perplexity and chagrin at VFR pilot selectionsof altitudes and coursesthat cut through
STAR or SID corridors. "For the life of me", puzzled one suchairman, "I do not under-
stand why any VFR pilot would want to fly anywhere near air carrier routings." This
comment highlights a large gap in understandingbetween the IFR and VFR pilot com-
munities. Apparently this air carrier pilot reporter is not awarethat nowherein the VFR
charts, manuals, and documentsthat private pilots are trained to use are air carrier rout-
ings in terminal areasusefully depicted.
Our review of the conflict locations narrowed the "anywhere near" to more specific
locations on individual terminal area charts. In the descent phases, the critical IFR/VFR
flight path intersections clustered at the outer rims of the upper TCA ceiling layers, here
narrow, chute-like arrival routes angle downward into ILS feeder fixes even as VFR
traffic skirts the TCA in the same vicinity. At those terminals with 7000 or 8000 foot
ceiling heights, the altitudes to avoid ranged from 7000 to 10,000 feet in the descent cor-
ridors.
The "hot spots" for IFR/VFR confrontations were less well defined in the SID de-
parture routings; conflict patterns were more erratic; and fewer SID procedures were
identified by name in the narratives. Altitudes of these boundary conflicts sometimes
were low--airliners at times emerged through the sides of the TCA enclosures if held
down within the TCA. Overall, the climbout corridors apparently tended to carry air
carriers away from the main stream of over-the-top VFR traffic flow.
There was one major challenge to the air carrier flight crew concept that the tier of
altitudes above TCA ceilings "belonged" to IFR aircraft. The airspace directly overhead
the terminal complex was heavily utilized by the more sophisticated segments of the VFR
community--the air taxis, short haul commuters and private pilot cross country missions.
These high time, more experienced VFR operators demonstrated sharp, pragmatic know-
how regarding ATC system workings. Their over-the-top, direct routings anticipated that
air carriers normally would not enter or exit TCA ceilings directly overhead the runway
complex. However, at certain terminals, use of preferential runways requires a 180 degree
reversal of course after takeoff: heavily loaded air carriers are programmed via these SID
procedures to emerge through the TCA roof directly above the airport layout, so this
presumption is not always correct.
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GA Territory. - While the IFR airspace users protested the VFR incursions through
arrival/departure corridors, general aviation pilots staked out claims to the lower altitudes
beneath the TCA floors. Their attitudes were consistent and firm: air carders "did not
belong" in local VFR training areas. The reporters--frequently low time students or flight
instructors--expressed dismay at sighting airline jets thundering through "their" space.
"There is no excuse for this", complained one private pilot. "At their speed, there is little
time to get out of their way"; "I roiled out of a turn and found myself head to head with
an air carder"; "We stay out of their airspace", snapped a light plane instructor, "they
should stay out of ours!"
Additional assertions that the boundary areas below the upper TCA floors "belong"
to VFR airmen were evident in corporate pilot submissions. ATC classification of their
activities as "general aviation" apparently denies them access to high altitude entry and
exit transitions at some major TCA terminals. Such reporters "wanted out" from their
usual low altitude passages through the sides of TCAs. "We have to zigzag our way
through congested layers of low level VFR activities", stated an executive pilot. Another
report read, "Most of us can out-climb, out-cruise, and out-perform almost any type of air
carder. So, we should be handled in the same way they are."
This same theme was present in reports by several airmen operating turboprop equip-
ment for the new generation of air carders serving many of the short haul, intercity mar-
kets. Their reported experiences suggest that airspeed differentials can and do lead to
overtake conflicts in the TCA boundary mix. "Our climb speed is 170 knots", stated one
airman, "We do not belong in altitudes and areas with aircraft flying at 70 or 80 knots."
Similarly, regional air carder pilots abjured any rights to the low altitude below-TCA-
floor areas while laying claim to higher strata. Summarized one commuter captain, "I've
had too many near collisions with VFR (boundary) traffic. Air carder jets are required to
stay above the TCA floors. Our turboprops belong there too."
Inevitably, a number of airmen reporters of TCA boundary conflicts progressed to
what appeared to them a self-evident conclusion. If all participants in a near midair
collision were legal and without blame, thensomething must be wrong with the ATC
system. "Simply stating that VFR aircraft are responsible for their traffic is ignoring that
a problem exists." "The controllers at this facility all believe that the IFR/VFR mix (at
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our TCA boundaries) tests the see-and-avoid concept to its limits." "I believe the system
is at fault", and finally, "There has g_Q_t-to be a better way than this!" The reporters'
phraseology varied, but the ultimate assessments of system deficiency were unequivocal.
Many of the "something is wrong with the system" deductions were associated with
the absence of radar traffic advisories prior to the conflict occurrences.
Role of Traffic Advisories
"We screamed at Departure for not advising us of the traffic .... They
said they had no traffic on their scope."
As noted previously, this dataset contains 381 reports of conflicts in boundary areas
adjacent to TCAs, many of them described as narrowly avoided collisions. One hundred
thirty-seven (137) of these air carrier encounters with VFR aircraft took place in above-
TCA ceiling altitudes. In 100, ATC provided no radar callouts of traffic prior to pilot
conflict detections. In areas below TCAs, 116 air carrier/small aircraft conflicts were
reported; in 73 of these there were no prior advisories of nearby traffic. Thus, in the
dataset of 253 above-or-below conflicts, 173 appeared to be strictly see-and-avoid affairs,
without traffic advisories from ATC.
The conflict incident data submitted by VFR airmen and military pilots yielded
comparable statistics. Fifty-six of the 72 VFR/VFR single or twin engine incidents indi-
cated that no prior controller advisories of traffic had been issued, and the same was true
of 28 of the 42 military/VFR conflicts.
Figure 3 summarizes the conflict dataset with regard to issuance of ATC radar ad-
visory callouts.
The majority of air carrier pilot reports in this set of conflict events labelled the
VFR aircraft as "unknown and not using a transponder." The see-and-avoid convergen-
cies elicited sharp "What's going on?" types of queries to the controllers. "Why wasn't
the traffic called?" "Why wasn't the aircraft observed on radar? .... Why did the system
permit non-transponder, uncontrolled aircraft to operate in the congested terminal areas?"
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Such were typical questions in the cockpit-controller dialogue subsequent to the near
collision events.
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Figure 3. ISSUANCE OF TRAFFIC ADVISORIES IN CONFLICTS
LOCATED OUTSIDE TCA BOUNDARIES
Indeed, the AIM emphasizes ATC's limited radar coverage of VFR aircraft which are
not transponder equipped or whose transponders are not activated:
"It is very important for the aviation community to recognize the fact that there
are limitations to radar service and that ATC controllers may not always be
able to issue traffic advisories concerning aircraft which are not under ATC
control and cannot be seen on radar .... the amount of reflective surface of an
aircraft will determine the size of the radar return. Therefore, a small air-
craft...will be more difficult to see on radar than a large commercial jet .... "
The Critical Need for Traffic Advisories. - The hazard level in these non-targeted
conflicts appeared high. The unexpected sightings of the converging aircraft frequently
were late, at times too late for evasive maneuvers. Forty-five reports indicated that the
two aircraft passed with neither controller intervention nor pilot evasive actions. Evasive
actions, when taken, were hard, quick responses: "I sounded out and pushed the yoke
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forward"; "The S/O shouted, 'watch outI' My eyebrow window was completely filled
with the undersideof a light colored twin"; "The first officer said, 'Oh, my!' and point-
ed"; "The F/O made an exclamation. I looked up to see a twin engine plane bearing
down on us"; "Our window was full of his belly and right engine".
The smaller number of reports submitted by the VFR conflict participants exhibited
similar elements of surprise and alarm. Passenger yells of "Watch out!", "I looked up to
see...", and rushed maneuvers "to get the hell out of the way" colored the narrative.
Several general aviation airmen registered strenuous protests at air carrier failures to
maintain traffic vigilance in a see-and-avoid environment.
"The air carrier flight crew must have had their heads 'down and locked'. All
they had to do was to look out their windows to see me. My aircraft must
have filled their entire windshield."
Why Advisories Were Not Given. - Pilots often demanded to know why advisories
had not been issued and quoted controller responses: "Asked departure if he had the light
twin, radar said, 'No'. .... The controller replied 'Negative'. .... The controller said that he
did not have him on radar. Why, I do not know." "Such failures to paint non-transpond-
er equipped aircraft creates a widespread belief that despite all the regulations, the ATC
system is operating in an atmosphere of blind luck!"
Scores of ATC controller reports confirmed that the "unknowns" were not painting
targets on their scopes. "The air carrier pilot asked if I had traffic...I informed him that I
observed no primary or secondary targets in his vicinity. He then said he wanted to file a
near miss report."
Scattered through the data were controller mentions of facility radar limitations.
Factors associated with the non-sighting of VFR aircraft include no transponder squawk
from the aircraft, target overlaps, aircraft passing through the "main bang" (antenna site),
and specific geographic areas of known poor radar coverage due to antenna locations and
the inherent limitations of radar.
Numerous reports noted a controller's belated observation of a "faint, primary target"
immediately subsequent to a pilot's calling of a near miss with untargeted traffic. Fre-
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quently tinged with dismay, airmen repeatedlyquoted near identical communicationswith
the TCA controllers: "The controller first replied, 'Negative', and then added, 'Oh, now I
seehim'. .... The controller said, 'No radar contact', then added, 'Yeah, now I seehim, six
o'clock and 2 miles'." "When queried,approachadvisedthey had a 'faint, primary target
behind us'."
A subsetof the after-the-conflict radar observationsof traffic included an additional
element: the suddenblossomingof a 1200 squawk behind the air carders' Mode C return.
"A transponder appeared immediately after the NMAC .... " "The controller said he had
nothing in the area and then he said, 'Just now a VFR 1200 code started squawking
behind me'. .... A 1200 squawk appeared right after the near midair .... " "We pushed
down, passed underneath him. 'No traffic', said the controller. Moments later, the con-
troller reported a transponder return, a target westbound at 7200 feet .... " A controller's
viewpoint: "The pilot must have had the life scared out of him and was reminded that
his transponder was not tumed on."
The least satisfactory responses to airmen's queries regarding uncalled traffic were
statements that uncontrolled VFR aircraft operating outside the TCA airspace dimensions
were outside controller jurisdiction and responsibility:
"We enquired from departure as to who the other traffic was that we almost
hit. The reply was that he did not have to point out VFR traffic that was
outside the TCA."
"We evaded .... When the captain asked the controller why they had not pointed
out traffic, his reply was, 'We don't have time to point out all the traffic'."
"No traffic was issued to the air taxi because... [he] was outside and below the
floor of the TCA."
"I asked departure about it...the controller said he was at 7500 feet and not in
the TCA, since top of the TCA was 7000 .... Nevertheless, a dead-on target
should be called out!"
Two flight crew reports related an "I don't believe what I'm hearing" response to
controllers' seemingly complacent acceptance of near collisions:
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"After we passedunderneaththe other aircraft, we told approachthat we had
just missed a guy, whereupon the controller gave us a standard 'Roger' re-
sponse!"
"We advisedapproachthat we had just had a near midair. The controller an-
swered,'Roger, your near midair. Numeroustargetsyour vicinity'."
Thus the causal structureof the reportedoutside-the-boundaryconflicts seemsdomi-
nated by two factors: the absenceof ATC advisory services alluded to above, and the
subjective territorial attitudes of the participants discussedpreviously. The one charac-
teristic this set of incidents had in common was that all participantswere legal and per-
forming in accord with formal aviation system requirements. Thus it appearedto the
majority of thesereporters that outside-the-boundaryconflicts are an outgrowth of basic
system design. Inside-the-boundaryconflicts--and the airspace incursions that spawn
them--presenta different picture which we describein the next section.
TCA INCURSIONS
"I thought I was at least 7 miles south of the TCA when the ap-
proach controller advised me that I was over the XYZ outer mark-
er..."
A total of 213 reports of TCA incursions were submitted to the ASRS during the
seven-year period covered by the dataset used in this study. Broad categorical comments
by controller reporters indicate many other similar transgressions were neither reported to
the ASRS nor to the FAA. "TCA violations are common at this facility..." noted such a
report. "There are frequent penetrations of our TCA at this facility", stated another con-
troller. One apparently exasperated controller wrote, "Three times this same aircraft has
violated our TCA. Today, I managed to track him to ABC field; then my supervisor told
me to forget it!"
Figure 4 illustrates who committed the unauthorized TCA penetrations and describes
the conflict outcomes. VFR pilots, the most frequent violators, submitted almost the same
number of reports as air carrier pilots, who mostly observed TCA violations. Quite dif-
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ferent motivations for reporting are implicit in the data, however. All the air carder pilot
reports referencedresultant conflicts. There was a clear note of ire in the narratives;they
felt victimized by the combination of airspacepenetrationsand (usually) the absenceof
timely advisories of such penetrations from ATC. Conversely, only six of the VFR
reporters describedconflicts resulting from their actions. Many indicated that they were
facing possible enforcementactions.
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Figure 4. CONFLICTS RESULTING FROM TCA PENETRATIONS
Causes of TCA Incursions
While controllers can observe "unknowns" straying through their airspace boundaries,
they seldom know why these penetrations take place. However, 68 of the 74 pilot
reporters provided four basic categories of explanation for their errant actions. Further, a
theme running through all these reports is limited experience, or lack of knowledge, in
coping with TCA operations.
The first explanation was the ordinary "goof': "It was such a beautiful day and I
was enjoying the countryside immensely. Unfortunately .... " "I got so distracted flying the
airplane that I did not realize .... " "I forgot about the TCA completely .... " "I got con-
fused .... " "I should have watched my heading more closely .... " One pilot revealing a far
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less professional attitude complained, "No one told me the floor of the TCA was 1800
feet."
A second set of reports referenced unfamiliarity. "It was my inability to find land-
marks in an unfamiliar area." "I mistook bridge A for bridge B." "I misidentified two
similar looking freeway intersections .... " "The Everglades gave me no positive land-
marks .... " "There were no landmarks in the lake." These explanations often were preced-
ed by, "I realize that unfamiliarity is no excuse but .... "
A third group of general aviation reports blamed illegal entries upon inadequacies or
deficiencies in the TCA charts. "Nowhere on the chart did it say 'smokestack' as a land-
mark reference .... " "I find this particular chart very difficult to read", and, finally, "that
blankety-blank chart!" Several other pilots admitted to having been "caught out" without
TCA charts on board.
The fourth and final category of explanations related to communications: some indi-
viduais assumed that being in two-way radio contact with ATC carded an automatic
authorization for TCA entry. One airman's view: "No one told me to stay out of the
TCA." On some occasions, VFR pilots opted to "push ahead" rather than wait out
clogged radio frequencies. An air taxi pilot justified his entry with, "I'm flying a gas
guzzling twin on a schedule...what am I supposed to do? .... This is a common problem",
admitted one controller. "You are so busy that many aircraft can't get radio contact right
away and so [they] violate the TCA."
Attitudes Regarding TCA Incursions
Controllers. - ATC controller assessments of the seriousness of such penetrations
split sharply from the VFR airmen's opinions. They fumed at too-frequent violations:
"Many pilots don't seem to know or care about TCAs!" A number of controllers blamed
inadequate ground school instruction for the pilot errors. More cynical attitudes targeted
"...Kitty Hawk philosophies': Why bother with having TCAs if everyone ignores them?"
A Kitty Hawk philosophy is an apparent presumption that you are flying the only
airplane that exists.
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GA Pilots. - General aviation pilots focused upon what they perceived as the relative
innocuousness of their mistakes. "If I was in the TCA, it was only by a little bit." "I
only cut a little corner of the TCA." "The airliner only had to make a slight turn to
avoid me."
A few submissions reflected a cut-off-your-own-nose reaction: "Mode C was turned
off so as not to further advertise our transgression in the event it had not yet been ob-
served", and, "If ATC follows this up with a violation, then in the future, I simply will
not use Mode C in the vicinity of TCAs since this is the only way the FAA has of de-
tecting such violations." However, such escapism was rare. The majority of airmen
candidly admitted blame, concluding their narratives with such phrases as 'TI1 be more
careful next time", 'Tll prepare better in the future" and similar expressions of personal
growth through their experiences.
Several airmen strenuously argued that they had not penetrated TCA boundaries.
They insisted that they had turned, or descended, just prior to entry and that ATC allega-
tions of TCA incursions were wrong.
Finally, it is noteworthy that 45 of the 68 non-conflict penetration reports submitted
by light plane pilots indicated that these pilots were flying out of peripheral fields located
below or near the TCA boundaries.
Penetrations Resulting in Conflicts
One hundred twenty-three unauthorized intrusions by "unknowns" culminated in
traffic conflicts with IFR aircraft. Fifty of these IFR/VFR conflict participants received
prior callouts of traffic from TCA controllers, but late sighting of the small aircraft led to
close encounters. In the remainder of cases, the air carrier/uncontrolled VFR aircraft
convergencies were completely unexpected occurrences with no radar targeting of the
non-transponder equipped intruders.
Only six of this set of within-the-TCA conflicts were reported by the VFR partici-
pants, so we know little of the "why" or the "how" of their penetrations. The aircraft
entered and exited the TCAs as unknowns. However, there is no reason to believe that
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the explanations for their errors would differ appreciably from explanations to TCA
incursions which did not result in conflicts. Undoubtedly, some of these incursions were
intentional, but we t_ave no hard evidence of this fact, nor did any of the reporters admit
to advertent penetrations of TCAs.
Following is a sampling of narratives relating to non-targeted IFR/VFR conflicts
subsequent to a TCA intrusion. The near collisions stirred air carrier flight crew reactions
best typified by this comment: "Please! No more surprises!"
"While descending through 5800 feet, a small single engine aircraft was ob-
served at 1 to 2 o'clock. He was in an evasive maneuver and passed approxi-
mately 200 feet above our aircraft."
"This could have been disastrous...Approach radar said they had no transponder
display, did not show any aircraft in our vicinity, and commented that the
aircraft was violating the TCA."
"On approach to 09R, on glide slope, at 2500 feet, observed small aircraft
crossing from 10 o'clock approximately 50 feet below our altitude. No time to
take evasive action."
"Since floor of the TCA is 1900 feet here, appears that other aircraft was
violating TCA."
In summary, every TCA incursion risks a conflict, and when conflicts do result, IFR
flight crews are frequently "caught napping", and have little opportunity to take considered
avoidance action. In this dataset, most of the incursions resulted from blunders of one
kind or another associated with inadequate planning, navigation errors, or communications
breakdowns. A small minority may have been intentional. Some of the incursions, as
well as the previously discussed outside-the-boundary conflicts were caused in part by
difficulties experienced by VFR pilots in gaining access to TCA airspace. This topic--
vigorously discussed in many VFR pilots' submissions--merits further examination.
TCA ACCESS BY GENERAL AVIATION PILOTS
"As usual, refused entry into the TCA. As usual, vectored the hell
out of everybody's way but not toward my destination .... "
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As air carder flight crews counted off perceived ATC system deficiencies and TCA
controllers called for cessation of the too-frequent penetrations of the restricted terminal
areas, general aviation pilots protested minimum or nonexistent ATC services associated
with VFR passage through or around TCAs.
Many general aviation airmen reports depict attempts to obtain TCA clearances as
frustrating, exasperating incidents, never to be repeated. Not only were the light plane
reporters frequently denied enroute transits through the terminal areas, but they were then
vectored many miles off their direct routes to their destinations. At times, their entries
were approved only after holding periods in the crowded boundary areas. Requests for
radar advisory services while circumnavigating the TCA enclosures frequently received
short-shrifted rejections.
Denials of Entry
The narrative tones of airmen's protests ranged from simple, "I don't understand it"
comments to strongly phrased objections alleging unfair treatment. "TCA controllers give
us [GA pilots] a hard time. Apparently they can't stand the thought of VFR planes going
through their airspace." "When I contact the TCA controller for entry, he is always 'too
busy' to let me through the TCA." "Unable", "too many aircraft", "I don't have time for
you": such were the quoted controller phrases that preceded the "remain clear of the
TCA" instructions. Similar comments referenced ATC refusals to provide VFR traffic
advisories: "After I idented, the controller said he was too busy for any VFR advisories";
"Approach informed me that he would not provide me with advisory service"; "The
controller replied, 'Unable; you are on your own; so long'." Denials of ATC services
stung reporters into finger-pointing charges of discrimination: "It appears to me that ATC
is unfair to private pilots"; "We are not treated equally!"; "ATC is unresponsive"; and
"The TCA controllers at this facility keep insisting that their concerns for air carrier safety
are paramount."
Ironically, numerous light plane airmen, denied TCA entry, displayed concern at
being forced to fly through the VFR-congested boundary areas encircling TCA airspaces.
"There was no reason for the controller to abandon me in a potentially unsafe, heavily
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saturated traffic environment!" reported one private pilot. Similar concern for their own
safety led two reporters to question a controller's motivations:
"The controller apparently felt that if a collision occurred, it would take place
outside the TCA and so, outside his jurisdiction."
"We were denied TCA entry .... this increased the risk of a midair due to the
numbers of light aircraft in the area. Since my conflicting traffic would be
VFR and below the TCA, the controller's responsibility for a midair would
therefore be minimized."
VFR pilots may not fully appreciate ATC guidelines regarding VFR passage through
TCA airspace. Controller workload priorities are spelled out on every TCA area chart:
VFR transits through the TCA are authorized "when traffic conditions permit". Similar
conditional approvals apply to requests VFR pilot requests for traffic advisories. All 23
TCA charts carry notations that such additional services will be offered "on a workload
permitting basis".
Outside-the-TCA Vectoring
Another set of general aviation reporters asserted that off-course vectoring during
circumnavigation of terminal areas constitutes unwarranted ATC control over VFR activi-
ties. "I was below the TCA", narrated one private pilot, "so, I should have been able to
proceed on my course direct to my destination." Another: "Since I was outside the TCA
airspace, I saw no reason why I should be issued so many changes in heading." And, a
controller reports: "The small plane pilot was not happy with being vectored some 40
miles out of his way .... He made remarks and finally stopped responding to any of my
instructions."
Pilots of light aircraft who had filed IFR flight plans, and who intended to cross
over TCAs, sometimes fared no better than the VFR reporters. Upon changeover to TCA
approach frequency, their over-the-top planned flight tracks were amended to circuitous
routings that reportedly added as much as 60 miles to their planned flight.
Such experiences spawned "never again" types of pilot reactions. No more zigzag
courses around the TCA airspace blocks, no more "umpteen" changes in frequencies,
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headingsand/or altitudes. The planned alternativesconsistedof "off with the transpond-
er", "no call-ins to ATC", and go it on their own via over-the-top direct tracks toward
their destinations.
"In the future, I will avoid all radar services, vectorings, and advisories and fly
under the TCA with no radio communications and no transponder rather than
be harassed this way."
"On my last 3 flights, I cancelled IFR, flew over the TCA and re filed again
after I transited the area."
"In the past, the TCA controller is always 'too busy' to let me through the
TCA. Worse, I am then issued a complicated set of directions taking me
completely around the TCA, tripling my flight distance and running me through
high density traffic around the TCA .... So, now I go VFR and fly over the top
of the TCA."
"It's simply too much trouble", summarized one such VFR pilot reporter, "They
delay you, vector you, and if you happen to be coming down in the area you might be
caught in...holding...Why bother?"
Silent Rejection
A number of general aviation reporters indicated that ATC's "not welcome in the
TCA" attitudes toward VFR aircraft, may, at times, extend into "Don't bother me" modes
of silent, brush-off treatment. Some of these reporters expressed puzzlement as to why
their repeated initial call-ins and/or requests for advisory services were not answered. In
some narratives, radio equipment problems were theorized as possible explanations. Other
airmen presumed that controllers were busy and continued their calls, with wonderment
that "there were only two or three aircraft on the frequency" or "there did not seem to be
much radio traffic". .... ._
However, a subset of these reporters discerned an apparent relationship between the
controller's belated acknowledgment of their calls and their departure from the terminal
area. "Only after repeated calls did the controller answer me. He informed me that I was
leaving his area." At times, the reports noted that a message content of "leaving the area"
with "a frequency change" comprised both the initial acknowledgment and sign-off. Some
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pilots were bluntly accusatory:
"This is a statementthat XYZ approachignoresVFR traffic moving along the
shoreline. Many of us have the feeling that XYZ controllers areeither ignoring
or pretending not to hear our requestsfor advisoriesuntil our aircraft are be-
yond their area. Then, they hear you and advise you that you are out of their
area."
The preceding citations leave little doubt that there exists a segment of the VFR
flying community which believes that its members are treated as "second-class citizens" in
TCA and near-TCA environments, and this they strongly resent. The extent of such
attitudes is not known, but their potential for undermining safety is obvious and should be
taken into account by those who design and operate the aviation system.
ATC TCA BOUNDARY OPERATING POLICIES
"After our near miss, the controller advised that many light aircraft
flew in the area just below the TCA."
There are no buffer areas around TCA airspace. By legal definition, one foot of
altitude above a TCA ceiling or below a TCA floor places an aircraft outside TCA bound-
aries. Identical horizontal tolerances apply to aircrafts' lateral separation from TCA walls.
As practical flight parameters, such margins are meaningless. It can be argued that
TCA boundaries should be treated as maximum "never exceed" limits, red-lined areas of
operation not to be approached too closely by either VFR or 1FR aircraft.
The AIM's coverage of collision hazards at TCA boundaries conveys a similar,
"stay-away-from-trouble" message. "VFR aircraft are cautioned against operating too
closely to TCA boundaries .... "" Yet, many of the conflict reports in the study dataset
" U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Airman'_ Inf0rm_-
ti0n Manual, November, 1987, Section 3, paragraph 97b(a)(d).
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indicate that numerousVFR airmenchooseto operateon or very close to TCA boundar-
ies.
The Upper Boundary
Air carrier pilots reported the majority of near miss events in the above-the-TCA
environment. They cited conflicting traffic at or within a few hundred feet of ceiling
altitudes. "The incident occurred at 8000 feet, the exact ceiling of the TCA." "Upon
advising ATC of our near miss (at 7100 feet), we were told, 'TCA ceiling in that area is
7000 feet'." "We were passing 7000 feet (TCA ceiling) when we saw the aircraft. We
pushed down beneath him." Etc.
In many reports, the circumstances precluded an exact determination of the altitudes
of conflicting uncontrolled traffic. Abrupt, come-and-gone sightings of the converging
aircraft, and frequently, hard evasive changes in body angle and climb or descent rates
tended to blur perception of conflict altitudes. "All that really registered was that this
object was filling my windshield." "It was a traumatic two or three second period."
Air Carrier Pilot Knowledge of TCAs. - Air carrier pilots often asked controllers
whether conflicting traffic had been in or out of the TCA, a question which implicitly
revealed their uncertainty regarding TCA dimensions. These airmen tended to quote or
paraphrase controllers' statements as confirmation of the TCA ceiling heights. "The con-
troller then said the TCA ceiling was 7000." "I asked departure .... the controller said the
traffic was at 7500 feet and then added that the TCA ceiling was 7000 foot tops," "We
were informed that the TCA ceiling was 7000." These numerous "controller said" in-
clusions suggest that the air carrier flight crews often have not acquired working know-
ledge of TCA shapes and dimensions although the information is available to them and,
as certificated pilots, they have a duty to be conversant with all aspects of the airspace in
which they operate.
GA Pilot Knowledge of TCAs. - On the other hand, the general aviation pilots who
submitted reports of their above-the-TCA-ceiling conflicts displayed certain knowledge of
their cruise altitudes and the height of the TCA airspace beneath them. They knew they
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were in a see-and-avoidenvironment and frequently expressedindignation that air carrier
pilots "obviously were not participating in the see-and-avoidsystem". One shakenpilot,
overflying a TCA at a legal 7500 foot altitude, presentedthe VFR airman viewpoint:
"Only by the grace of God did I see this airliner climbing head-on straight at me...they
just popped out of the TCA and if they had only looked out their window my aircraft
would have filled up their entire field of vision!"
The Floor Boundary
The AIM's injunction againstoperatingtoo closely to TCA boundariescontinuesinto
a more specific warning: "...especially where normal cruise altitudes are at or near the
floor of higher levels [of the TCA], observanceof this precautionwill reducethe potential
for encounteringa TCA aircraft at floor altitudes."" Air carrier jet departures seldom are
held down to TCA floor altitudes. However, at almost all major airports, arrivals are
routinely stairstepped down during initial approach from one floor level to the next, work-
ing their way through the complete tier of TCA rings. It is this inbound procession of air
carriers, often on vector headings while maintaining floor altitudes, that appears most
vulnerable to conflicts with light planes skimming beneath the TCA shelves.
Controller Vie.wpoint_ on Hazards at the Floors.
addressed these hazards in a general manner:
Controller reports sometimes
"A procedure is in use at XYZ that I feel has potential for a serious accident.
Inbound IFRs are routinely assigned altitudes at the floor of the TCA (4500
feet) since this is a normal VFR cruise altitude."
"Our normal procedure is to descend arrivals to the floor of the TCA (3000
feet). TCA violators are common in this area and separation frequently be-
comes lost between these arrivals and aircraft operating from XYZ field located
beneath the approach path to the runway."
The problems these controllers observe are not unique to these facilities. Controllers
at other locations verified the hazards of flying too closely to floor altitudes with air
carriers crossing directly above the VFR aircraft. "This area is recognized as one of
* Ibid.
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potential conflict. VFR pilots can maintain 2500 feet, stay below the TCA and become
traffic." "The dimensionsof our TCA allow VFR aircraft to operatejust below the local-
izer courseoutside the outer markers. Today, a light twin, unidentified, crossedin front."
Thirteen conflicts were reported at one major terminal betweenair carriers on final ILS
approachand small planescrossing through the localizer courses. "If either aircraft strays
slightly", noted a controller, "then an unsafe situationbecomesdangerous."
Air Cartier Pilot Perceptions. - From an air carrier perspective, the most unaccep-
table variety of close-to-TCA-floor conflicts are those which occur after they have inter-
cepted the localizer and are on the glide slope. Such conflicts produced comments of
dismay and non-comprehension of a traffic control system that permitted uncontrolled
traffic through the approach lanes. "How can it be legal", asked one airman, "for a pilot
to be flying through this area at 1499 feet with no ATC communications, when the TCA
floor is 1500 feet? .... I suggest my life is on the line", protested another crew member,
"when it is legally possible for VFR aircraft to pass so closely to the approach path of
IFR aircraft! .... There seems to be something wrong with the system", concluded another
report, "to permit this to happen." "After our near miss on the localizer, the controller
said that the other aircraft was below the TCA and there was nothing they could do about
the situation."
The same minimal vertical separation intervals noted in above-the-TCA incidents
reappeared in below-the-TCA-floor reports. "The pilot asked if the light twin was in the
TCA. I replied that it would depend on his exact altitude--if he were one foot above
3000 feet, then he was in the TCA." "The floor of the TCA was at 3000 feet so the
other aircraft could have been legal at 2999 feet!"
GA. Pilot Flight Policies and Perceptions. - Some VFR pilots appear to believe that
100 feet is an adequate buffer for flight beneath TCA floors. "Mindful of the 1500 foot
TCA floor, I flew at 1400 feet." "I descended to 2900 feet which was beneath the 3000
foot floor." "Without even asking for my altitude (2900 feet), the controller stated that I
was in the TCA (3000 feet)." An air carrier report: "I queried ATC about our near miss.
Controller advised floor of the TCA was at 1900 feet and the other aircraft apparently
was at 1800 feet." Other general aviation pilots indicated that planned tangential flight
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tracks placed them within a fraction of a mile of curving TCA sidewalls. It is not
known whether thesepilots' perspectivesand practices are typical of the GA community
as a whole.
The squeezeof traffic into narrow altitude bands in canal-like passageswinding
through metropolitan areasbeneathTCA floors is a matter of serious concern to some
VFR reporters. "An accidentwaiting to happen" accordingto one reporter. "I've come to
dread flying anywherenearthis VFR corridor....It should be called 'suicide corridor!' .... I
believe a serioushazardexists due to the compressionof VFR traffic beneaththe lateral
TCA limits."
Differing Perceptions of TCA Airspace
The foregoing data strongly suggest that fundamentally different ways of looking at
TCAs (and possibly other types of restricted airspace) exist among segments of the avia-
tion community. That IFR pilots, VFR pilots, and controllers may each view the subject
uniquely is not surprising; the technologies the three use and the control environments in
which they operate are different. These foster differing perceptions of the same airspace
which increase the likelihood of conflicts within it.
The IFR Pilot's Perceptions. - As previously discussed, many IFR pilots appear to
have only a vague knowledge of TCA dimensions. This may not seem a serious matter
to them since they are usually under positive control. They simply comply with clearan-
ces from controllers who are assumed to understand the nuances of airspace boundaries.
However vague on exact dimensions, IFR airmen reports poignantly reveal their
awareness of the TCA's existence as a protective mechanism. There is an extra edge of
outrage in the phraseology of reports that describe a nerve-shattering traffic convergence
and end with the notation (sometimes incorrect) that it happened in TCA airspace.
VFR Airmen'_ Perceptions. - Although fewer in relative number, reports from VFR
airmen were similarly revealing. Two viewpoints predominate in their narratives.
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First, the phraseologyin many of the reports suggests that the writers view the TCA
as merely a legal restriction on their freedom of action--not as the delimiter of a region of
heightened real risk to themselves. Such pilots edge to a hundred feet or less of floor
boundaries or fly tangential tracks only an eighth of a mile from curving TCA sidewalls.
They seem much like motorists on a lightly trafficked freeway deciding to risk 10 mph
over the posted speed limit. The risk considered is that of getting caught in a speed trap
and fined; there is no sweaty-palmed fear of smashup simply because of the added incre-
ment of speed. For these pilots, the absence of fear vitiates the AIM's admonition against
"operating too closely", and their flying practices drastically shrink the undefined buffer
zone that one might hope the VFR flying community would create by complying with the
AIM's earnestly worded advisory.
Second, phraseology in several reports coupled with common experience of individu-
als participating in this study effort give rise to the hypothesis that VFR airmen intuitively
tend to conceive of the TCA as an ¢nvelope completely enclosing the in-the-TCA traffic.
Such pilots might be surprised to learn that ATC routinely clears IFR aircraft to TCA
floor and ceiling altitudes. This hypothesis has become a central feature of an additional
ASRS study examining TCA incursions with specific reference to pilot perceptions of
TCA airspace.
Controller's Perspective. The FAA designs TCAs and its controllers have full
jurisdiction over them. Controller reporters are obviously zealous in their efforts to per-
form in strict accord with ATC doctrine and prescribed procedures as they clear aircraft
into and through the airspaces that they "own".
ATC partitions or "sectorizes" airspace for control purposes. Sectors are defined in
terms of altitudes and lateral boundaries, and controllers assigned to sectors have exclu-
sive control over them. In ATC parlance, a "high" sector might be spoken of as "own-
ing" 11,000 feet on up, whereas the "low" sector beneath "owns" the altitudes up to and
including 10,000, thereby creating a buffer zone of 1000 feet between the two sectors.
The notion of ownership is crucial here because it is clear from the evidence in this
study dataset and the testimony of controller analysts who participated in the study, that
from ATC's perspective it "owns" the floor and ceiling altitudes of TCAs. They are not
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separating fences, as the VFR pilot community may view them; they are simply available
operational altitudes routinely used by controllers. The matter-of-fact reference in the
AIM to "...TCA aircraft at floor altitudes" underscores this conclusion.
BUFFER ZONES
If all pilots accepted and complied with the AIM's advisories regarding flight near
TCAs, a de facto buffer zone would exist at TCA boundaries. This study dataset contains
incontrovertible evidence that there is an unknown but significant number of pilots who
do not fly in this manner. We are not considering those who deliberately penetrate TCAs
here--just those whose "close flying" policies collapse the AIM's advisory buffer. Accord-
ingly, the possible redesign of TCAs to include formal buffer zones merits careful con-
sideration.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
ASRS reports submitted by pilots and ATC controllers were examined with regard to
two known problems associated with TCA boundary operations: (1) IFR/VFR traffic
conflicts in airspace layers above TCA ceilings and below TCA floors (381 incidents);
and (2) incursions into TCA terminal airspace by VFR aircraft (213 incidents).
The number of incidents reported over the seven-year period is modest, reflecting an
undesirable but hardly dramatic level of hazard in view of the many millions of opera-
tions into or out of the 23 TCAs each year, but this study's principal concern was the
causal dynamics of such events, not their frequency, and it succeeded in discovering a
great deal in this regard. The study's principal conclusions and associated recommenda-
tions are as follows:
The geographical pattern of boundary conflicts differs among TCAs. At
some, almost all the conflicts were reported at above-TCA ceiling altit-
udes; at others, the majority took place below floor levels.
27
Various factors influence the geography of boundary conflicts: locations of peripheral
general aviation fields, the tailorings of TCA configurations in response to local operation-
al needs, preferential runway use, ATC facility practices, STAR/SID procedures, etc.
Comprehensive identification of TCA "hot spots" was beyond the scope of this study.
Air carrier pilots frequently indicated uncertainty about TCA dimensions--
particularly ceiling altitudes with their implied risk of VFR traffic con-
flicts. By contrast, VFR pilots often revealed precise knowledge of TCA
boundaries.
Awareness of TCA vertical and horizontal boundaries should be regarded as "must know",
vital operational knowledge rather than mere "nice to know" information. Several report-
ers suggested that printing TCA ceiling heights on all SID charts could provide such
critical information in air carrier cockpits.
GA pilots expect the portions of TCA ceilings directly overhead main
airport complexes to be untrafficked by outbound TCA traffic. However,
some SIDs direct outbound IFR traffic into the thick of VFR traffic
passing over the airport.
Some SIDs require 180 degree climb reversals. IFR traffic flying these SIDs tends to
emerge through TCA ceilings above the airports from which they originated into the heav-
iest flow of over-the-top VFR traffic. This appears to be an imprudent practice given GA
pilot expectations and operational patterns.
While the center portions of TCA ceilings are viewed as "GA country"
(by GA pilots), air carrier pilots are equally possessive of the airspace
surrounding the outer rims of TCA layers where the STAR descent
corridors angle downward into the terminal areas. However, the typical
descent paths of air transports are not depicted in the charts commonly
carried by GA airmen.
It appears that the general aviation community should be informed (perhaps via pictorial
overlays on VFR Terminal Area Charts) as to the normal arrival routings of air carriers.
Typical descent altitudes at such rim areas must be known to be avoided by VFR aircraft.
Despite the AIM's counsel to VFR pilots circumnavigating TCAs, some
VFR airmen cruise either at boundary altitudes or within a few hundred
feet of them. Others fly tangential tracks which are planned to pass
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within as little as one-eighth mile of TCA lateral boundaries. The de facto
buffer zone which would exist if all VFR pilots heeded the AIM's admoni-
tions is not a reality for this traffic.
The question of whether a VFR aircraft is legally outside a TCA by a separation interval
of 10, 50, or 100 feet would be but a narrow and meaningless technicality if, as one
reporter bluntly phrased it, the pilot is "legal but dead". Some VFR airmen do not sense
the hazard--only the legal issue.
ATC "owns" the boundary altitudes of TCAs and uses them intensely as
it ladders arriving traffic along the floors of the TCA. This fact is often
missed by the VFR community.
This ATC practice exacerbates the problem caused by VFR pilots' failures to give TCAs a
wide berth. One airman plaintively asked: "Can someone give me a reason why this is
necessary? Another 500 feet of altitude would make no difference to a jet's descent rate
into final approach, yet it might save a midair."
ATC's practice of running IFR aircraft along TCA boundaries is incom-
patible with VFR pilots' perception of these boundaries as impermeable
• • " • " rtraffic barriers. This is especially true when the IFR traffic is routed ove
active GA airfields or near heavily used VFR flyways. As long as this
incompatibility persists there will be TCA boundary conflicts• It may be
necessary to establish formal buffer zones to achieve comprehensive
VFR/IFR traffic separation at TCA boundaries•
This is the _ingle most important conclusion arising from this study. Air carder pilots,
GA pilots, and ATC each have territorial attitudes towards the airspace which they use
heavily, and also towards adjacent buffering airspace. Unfortunately, all three implicitly
lay claim to the airspace adjoining TCA boundaries, this gives rise to conflicts, and
creates a need for formal buffer zones to maintain separation among the claimants.
Reports from GA pilots describing TCA incursions suggest that knowledge
and training deficiencies were factors in many of the occurrences.
Ninety of 213 TCA incursions included in this study were basically self-reported blunders
by errant pilots who cited inexperience with TCA procedures, difficulties in reading TCA
charts, unfamiliarity with the area, mix-ups regarding boundary landmarks, and so on. In
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45 of thesecases,the reporter was bound for, or hadjust takenoff from, a nearby general
aviation field. Required and recommendedTCA operational practices may need to be
more heavily emphasizedduring pilot training at all certification levels, but most espec-
ially when private pilots are licensed.
When TCA incursions gave rise to conflicts, air carrier pilots were often
caught "napping"; often there was little or no time for evasive action.
Air carrier pilots depend upon the protection provided by TCAs and ATC radar services.
When this protective cocoon is punctured it is a nerve-shattering experience and one
which evokes considerable ire. This ire is directed at the VFR intruders, at the controllers
who fail to advise of intruders' presence, and at FARs which permit aircraft to operate
legally in TCA vicinities without operating transponders.
Some GA airmen believe that they are treated as "second-class citizens"
when they operate in and around TCAs. They complain of denied entries,
rejected requests for traffic advisory services, off-course vectorings, and
inability to obtain ATC responses to their radio call-ups. ATC refusals to
permit GA IFR aircraft to track over the TCA ceilings on planned flight
paths were particularly galling. GA pilots' frustration sometimes causes
them to "opt-out" of the system. So they may turn off transponders,
neglect to advise ATC of their presence in heavily used airspace, decline
ATC services when they are available, and sometimes intentionally break
the rules.
Efforts to accommodate the needs of GA traffic wishing to transit or circumnavigate
TCAs need to be increased. More constructive attitudes need to be fostered. Controller
rejections of VFR requests for TCA transit or advisory services should be justified by
valid workload considerations. When services are denied because of workload, this
should be conveyed in standard phraseology employed for this purpose. Requests for
ATC services Should not be met with stony silence. At the same time, the VFR com-
munity needs to be better indoctrinated on controller duty priorities and the workloads
controllers bear.
The study dataset was rife with see-and-avoid failures. Air carrier and
VFR pilots seemed equally at fault.
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GA reporters decried a lack of traffic vigilance in air carrier cockpits even as air carrier
pilots noted that high workloads, both in climbs and in descents, reduced the frequency of
traffic scans during TCA transitions. One VFR pilot, counseling his air carrier counter-
parts, summed up the situation well:
"Despite your workload pressures, nevertheless, you should know that an en-
coding transponder does not protect you from VFR aircraft .... Putting your head
down and reading checklists or perusing your 'How-to-fly' manual pages is not
permissible ....
"My plea is this: everyone, including the 'big boys', should be careful and alert
when flying near TCA boundaries. Isn't this obvious?"
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Attachment A:
ACCESSION NUMBERS OF REPORTS USED IN THIS STUDY

Penetrations, No Conflicts (90)
8641 8656 8789 8792 8896 9133 9237 9246
9976 10059 10598 10812 11091 11116 11612 11851
11978 12233 12593 12583 13135 13275 14278 14343
14351 14632 14701 14736 14722 14894 14938 14950
15037 15261 15326 15360 15484 15573 15669 16365
16510 16524 16634 16654 17339 17690 18207 18494
18733 19154 19319 19502 19637 19638 20612 20642
20790 21287 21300 21588 21980 22129 22236 22328
23253 23304 23390 23407 23612 23929 24686 24798
24960 26313 26785 27419 27482 28053 28139 28285
28696 28709 28877 28993 29031 29369 29389 29709
30189 30448
Air Carrier/VFR Conflicts (137 of 253)
8862 8979 8992 9021 9030 9470 9568 9580
9844 9845 10346 10819 10884 10919 11061 11092
11226 11280 11314 11432 11827 11897 12030 12288
12426 12588 12737 12800 13372 13478 13777 13909
14186 14297 14757 14871 14906 15027 15050 15183
15261 15326 15360 15484 15493 15514 15533 15573
15647 15669 16069 16082 16221 16742 17022 17314
17336 17366 17543 17655 17841 17851 17902 18326
18654 18875 19587 19821 20042 20385 20589 20947
20981 21015 21114 21128 21301 21425 21469 21829
22055 22141 22257 22335 22961 22987 23044 23348
23510 23599 24099 24421 25015 25141 25346 25387
25587 25595 25657 25736 25686 25809 25823 25824
25843 25962 25970 26352 26422 26426 26464 26477
26701 26859 26956 27305 27712 27751 27785 28066
28470 28628 28672 28852 28859 28902 29316 29358
29794 30230 30251 30790 31088 31311 31418 31448
32324
VFR/VFR (72)
8801 9514 9734 10728 10767 10824 10912 11396
11457 12207 12423 12514 13119 13422 13522 13726
14190 14801 15080 15102 15163 15314 15317 15320
15343 15447 15470 15629 15679 15955 16354 16719
17819 17820 18373 19498 19563 20089 20386 20365
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VFR/VFR (continued)
20788 20888 20890 20891 21405 21506 22176 22320
22446 23619 23886 23890 24009 24029 24315 24832
25266 26586 26629 26721 27249 27571 27769 28306
28522 29119 29165 29341 29387 29452 30832 31496
Military/VFR Conflicts (42)
8761 8733 9324 9327 9341 9623 11314 11973
12319 13199 14540 15003 21179 21276 22718 23369
23693 24277 24256 24626 25213 25616 26096 26213
26261 26262 26265 26268 26448 26754 27001 27586
27596 27742 28400 28408 28415 28959 29293 29295
29867 30392
Penetration Conflicts (122)
8778 9184 9246 9450 9532 10459 10526 10597
10768 10927 10943 10952 11221 11530 11811 12243
12378 12379 12582 12668 12953 12965 12791 13050
13440 13441 13495 13690 14105 14108 14278 14454
14531 14722 14801 14863 15037 15102 15360 15493
15514 15616 15871 15875 15955 16068 16633 16648
17000 17032 17341 17670 17745 17820 17818 17826
18134 18289 18290 18612 18657 19385 19423 19488
19584 19503 19563 20234 20287 20298 20447 20542
20744 20808 20988 21422 21467 21673 21746 21767
21830 21949 21993 22262 22246 22535 22927 23275
23643 23713 23842 23886 23921 23929 23979 24029
24686 24798 25132 25177 25386 26311 26393 26460
26523 26553 26590 26635 26701 27295 28483 28650
28924 28925 29061 29346 29357 29699 29790 30662
31457 31517
Air Carrier/VFR Conflicts Below TCA (116 of 253)
9077 9684 9813 9838 9893 9933 10202 10220
10316 10320 10378 10418 10438 10767 10883 11077
11108 11205 11232 11392 11719 11790 11943 11973
A-4
Air Carrier/VFR Conflicts Below TCA (continued)
12078 12083 12207 12869 13392 13462 13587 14030
14152 14707 14765 14838 14889 14901 15183 15520
15723 15749 15947 15954 16075 16114 16223 16265
16365 16566 16523 16633 16648 16729 17106 17132
17414 17578 17657 17854 18267 19200 19338 19853
19906 20096 20382 20466 20672 20798 20804 21101
21505 21527 21602 22413 22415 23283 23718 23929
24322 24687 24706 24832 25140 25277 25318 25476
25550 25877 26151 26362 26632 26647 26817 27251
27393 27466 28130 28233 28280 28492 28498 28519
28686 28970 29164 29166 29179 29343 29345 29435
29775 29535 29631 30832
A-5
I. Report No.
NASA CR-177522
2. Government Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Human Factors in Aviation"
Boundary Conflicts
Terminal Control Area
7. Author(s)
Captain William P. Monan
9. Performing Or_nization Name and Addre_
Battelle Columbus Division,
625 Ellis Street, Suite 305
Mtn. View, CA 94043
ASRS Office
12, S_ns_ing Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Hoffett Field= CA 94035
3. Recipient's Catalog No.
5. Report Date
February 1989
6. Performing Organization Code
-.1
B. Performing Organization Report No.
10. Work Unit No,
49
11. Contract or Grant No.
NAS2-I1934
13 Type oi RepoF_ and Period C_)ve_ecf
14. Sponsorlng Agency Code
15. _Jpplementary Notes
Point of Contact: William D. Reynard, H/S 239-I
NASA Ames Research Ce_er
Moffett Field, CA 94035 (415) 694-6467
16, Abstract .A_r-to-atr conflicts in the vicinity of TCA boundaries were studied to obtain a better understanding of the
causal dynamics of these events with particular focus on human factor issues. The study dataset
consisted of 381 IFR/VFR traffic conflicts in airspace layers above TCA ceilings and below TCA floors;
213 reports of incursions in TCA terminal airspace by VFR aircraft, of which 123 resulted in conflicts;
and an additional set of reports describing problems with ATC services in and around TCAs.
Findings indicate that 1) The geographical pattern of boundary conflicts differs among TCAs depending
on the specific flow patterns of arriving and departing air carrier traffic; 2) Air carrier pilots are
frequently uncertain about TCA dimensions, in contrast to VFR pilots who more frequently possess
precise knowledge of TCA boundaries; 3) GA pilots expect the portions of TCA ceilings directly
overhead main airport complexes to be unlrafficked by outbound TCA traffic, an expectation that appears
imprudent given some SID routings that direct outbound IFR traffic into the heaviest flow of over-the-top
VFR traffic; 4) GA pilots commonly do not carry charts that depict the typical descent paths (STAR
descent corridors) of air transports through outer TCA rims into the terminal areas; 5) many VFR airmen
select cruising altitudes near TCA floor or ceiling altitudes, ignoring the AIM's caution against "operating
too closely"; 6) Many in the VFR community seem unaware that ATC intensively uses the boundary
altitudes of TCAs and considers itself to "own" these altitudes; 7) Reports from GA pilots describing
TCA incursions suggest that knowledge and training deficiencies were factors in many of these
occurrences; 8) Air carrier pilots were often caught "napping" when TCA incursions gave rise to
conflicts, with often little or no time for evasive action; 9) Some GA pilots believe that they are treated
as "second-class citizens" when they operate in and around TCAs, and their resultant frustration may lead
them to "opt-out" of the system; 10) Failures of the see-and-avoid concept were a feature of many of the
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